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1. ABSTRACT 
A key mechanism to unlock socio-economic development, particularly amongst young 
people is the active support of entrepreneurship.  One of the ways of encouraging 
entrepreneurship is by expanding access to finance, particularly through informal 
channels as traditional capital and financial markets are out of reach for many, 
particularly in nascent industries or for emerging businesses.   
The advent of the fourth industrial revolution, and the technological innovation it 
brings, could be a key catalyst to providing small business and entrepreneurs with 
access to new financial markets.  One such market is the ability to raise small amounts 
of money from a large number of people. 
The challenge for companies seeking to access crowd finance is that traditional 
legislation is focussed on the protection of investors and not necessarily on the 
liberalisation of investment choices.   
In order to give crowdfunding an opportunity to grow as a market, a balance will need 
to be struck between keeping the costs of accessing the crowdfunding market at a 
minimum without compromising on investor protection.  A key way of doing this will 
be through the relaxation of the regulatory framework relating to the offering of 
securities to the public, the establishment of regulated crowdfunding platforms and the 
standardisation of the constitutional documents of issuers.  Without these interventions, 
it is unlikely that a buoyant crowdfunding market can exist. 
2. INTRODUCTION 
One of the stated aims of the Companies Act1 is the promotion of innovation and 
investment in South African markets.2  Although the term "markets" is not defined, or 
used elsewhere in the Companies Act, given that among the other purposes of the 
Companies Act is encouraging entrepreneurship and enterprise efficiency,3 the creation 
of optimum conditions for the aggregation of capital for productive purposes,4 and 
                                               
1 Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
2 s 7(c). 
3 s 7(b)(ii). 
4 s 7(g). 
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reaffirming the company as a means of achieving economic and social benefits,5 the 
Companies Act is intended to provide for all companies, and not only those that operate 
within the formal structures of the financial markets.6   
A way in which developing countries can improve the socio-economic position of their 
citizens is by fostering innovative market practices and ensuring that the law (or any 
applicable legislative framework) is simple to understand and comply with, with the 
effect that it does not serve as a barrier to innovation.7 
The need for improved socio-economic conditions in South Africa cannot be 
understated.8  One of the means that are generally accepted to curb the dire socio-
economic state of developing countries is the creation of suitable conditions for 
entrepreneurship to thrive.9  Entrepreneurship in turn can be catalysed s by expanding 
access to finance.10  The concentrated structure of the South African banking system 
fosters a lower level of access to financial services,11 particularly for micro, small and 
medium enterprises.12 This is a trend so for such enterprises in so-called low income 
countries.13  Technology, and the innovation it brings, can be a key catalyst to providing 
small business and entrepreneurs with access to new financial markets.14  
                                               
5 s 7(d). 
6 Mongalo An overview of company law reform in South Africa: From the Guidelines to the Companies 
Act 2008 Acta Juridica: Modern Company Law for a Competitive South African Economy (2010) 
xxii. 
7 Bellantuono and Lara Law, Development and Innovation (2016) 194. 
8 The National Department of Statistics, South Africa estimates that approximately half of South Africa's 
adult population lives in poverty.  See Maluleke Men, Women and Children: Findings of the Living 
Conditions Survey 2014/15 Statistics South Africa South Africa (2018) 13. 
9 Tau Searching through dustbins (2019) xiii. See also South African National Planning Commission 
South African National Development Plan 2030 (2012) 119 where it is argued that regulatory reform 
and government support are key catalysts for boosting entrepreneurship which, in turn, will boost 
economic growth and employment. 
10 Lewis and Gasealahwe Lowering barriers to entrepreneurship and promoting small business growth in 
South Africa (2017) 8. 
11 Lewis and Gasealahwe (n 10) 36. 
12 Huang, Chiu, Mo and Marjerison "The nature of crowdfunding in China: initial evidence" 2018 Asia 
Pacific Journal of Innovation and Entrepreneurship 300. 
13 Huang, Chiu, Mo and Marjerison (n 12) 301. 
14 Lewis and Gasealahwe (n 10) 26 and Huang, Chiu, Mo and Marjerison (n 12) 301. 
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One of the markets that technology has made available to entrepreneurs, is access to 
capital and financing from "the crowd", an avenue outside of the formal financial 
markets operating in South Africa.15 
Crowdfunding has not been formally defined in South African law and, considering that 
stokvels have found themselves part of the daily lives of South Africans for a long 
time,16 crowdfunding is not a new phenomenon.17  The advent of technological 
innovation has, however, given a new lease on life for crowdfunding which is generally 
defined as follows: 
"an umbrella term describing the use of small amounts of money, obtained from a 
large number of individuals or organisations, to fund a project, a business or 
personal loan, and other needs through an online web-based platform."18 
There are primarily four types of crowdfunding, two are regarded as community based 
or altruistic crowdfunding forms and the other two are considered commercial or profit 
motivated.19   
The community based crowdfunding forms are donation based crowdfunding and 
reward crowdfunding.20  These forms do not provide a financial return on the amounts 
contributed, instead they are commonly used to enable  support for charitable causes or 
the early stage contribution towards the development of an innovative product, with the 
hope to receive a non-monetary benefit or other form of recognition for such 
contribution.  Other than the imperative to not support or be engaged in criminal 
activity, community based crowdfunding does not raise many corporate law issues.21 
                                               
15 Lewis and Gasealahwe (n 10) 36. 
16 South African National Planning Commission South African National Development Plan 2030 (2012) 
375. 
17 Makina The emergence of crowdfunding in South African financial markets South Africa (2017). 
18 Kirby and Worner "Crowdfunding: An infant industry growing fast" (2014) IOSCO Staff Working 
Paper 8. 
19 Kirby and Worner (n 18) 8. 
20 Kirby and Worner (n 18) 8. 
21 The most pertinent corporate law obligation would be the need to pay the appropriate tax on the 
contribution, which is likely to be the payment of donations tax in the event that the receiver does not 
give an appropriate quid pro quo for the contribution.  It is, however, possible for the receiver to 
apply for and obtain an exemption from having to pay donations tax for example in the event that the 
receiver undertakes public benefit activities. 
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The commercial or profit-motivated forms of crowd funding are peer-to-peer lending 
and equity crowd funding.  These two forms are defined as follows: 
"Peer-to-peer lending is a form of crowd-funding used to fund loans which are paid 
back with interest.  Equity crowd-funding is the raising of capital through the 
issuance of stock to a number of individual investors using the same method as 
crowd-funding." 22 
Peer-to-peer lending reportedly makes up 91% of the market for alternative funding in 
South Africa.23  One possible reason for this may be that the regulatory environment for 
making and receiving loans is institutionalised,24 relatively simple and certain.25  The 
environment in relation to so-called equity crowdfunding is not so and requires either 
the adaptation of existing regulatory frameworks in order to ensure their suitability or 
the creation of a new regulatory framework.26 
This dissertation examines the regulatory regime that applies to equity crowdfunding in 
South Africa and assesses whether such a regime is appropriate in the light of the 
imperatives of crowdfunding.  This dissertation also analyses what regulatory 
enhancements or innovative measures can, in the light of international practice, be 
introduced in South Africa in order to ensure that the crowdfunding revolution occurs in 
a manner that addresses South Africa's immense socio-economic challenges. 
Particular focus will be placed on models followed in the United States of America and 
China who, respectively through the African Growth and Opportunity Act and BRICS 
are likely to facilitate the investment in nascent industry in South Africa.  That they 
have fundamentally divergent corporate and regulatory cultures, and entrepreneurial 
cultures which are both outward looking and based on strong domestic fundamentals is 
also a benefit for this study. 
                                               
22 Kirby and Worner (n 18) 8. 
23 Lewis and Gasealahwe (n 10) 36. 
24 Lewis and Gasealahwe (n 10) 36. 
25 See generally the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (the "NCA") which provides for the establishment of 
the National Credit Regulator to, among other things promote and support the development of a fair, 
transparent, competitive, sustainable, responsible, efficient, effective and accessible credit market and 
industry.  The NCA is intended to democratize access to debt finance – section 60 of the NCA 
establishes a "right to credit" which proscribes a credit provider's right to refuse credit to reasonable 
commercial grounds. 
26 Lewis and Gasealahwe (n 10) 36. 
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3. MODELLING CROWDFUNDING REGULATION  
Despite the legal rules regulating the conduct of business in general, as well as taxation 
and insolvency being important considerations in understanding corporate finance 
decision-making,27 this dissertation will only consider the necessary infrastructure and 
key role players of crowdfunding in the light of their interaction with the law. 
There is at present no internationally recognized or standardised model through which 
equity crowdfunding is facilitated.28  Most models that have been reported on are either 
designed by way of a statutory framework or are bespoke and take into account the 
characteristics and needs of local investors,29 as well as the desire to ensure that the 
manner in which equity crowdfunding is designed and implemented benefits (or at least 
meets the expectations) of all relevant stakeholders.30  A key feature of crowdfunding is 
that it aims to operate outside of the bureaucratic channels established by existing 
financial markets.31  As some commentators observe:   
"The crowdfunding business ecosystem enables the demand and supply side of the 
investment process to interact directly without the intermediary functions that were 
provided by many financial institutions."32 
The goal of equity investment is normally to obtain a return from the investment made 
or to influence or  partake in development within a particular sector.  The enabling 
environment for equity crowdfunding can be designed in a manner that encourages 
investment in key or strategic sectors.33  This may also resonate with investors whose 
goals may transcend solely achieving financial returns.34 
                                               
27 Myers "Capital Structure" 2001 Journal of Economic Perspectives 81 100. See, however, Deakin 
"Corporate governance, finance and growth: Unravelling the relationship" in Mongalo (ed) "Modern 
Company Law for a Competitive South African Economy" (2010) Juta and Co Limited: Cape Town 
191 192. 
28 Huang, Chiu, Mo and Marjerison (n 12) 301. 
29 European Commission Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
European crowdfunding services providers for business COM Brussels (2018) 4. 
30 Huang, Chiu, Mo and Marjerison (n 12) 301. 
31 Huang, Chiu, Mo and Marjerison (n 12) 301. 
32 Huang, Chiu, Mo and Marjerison (n 12) 313. 
33 Huang, Chiu, Mo and Marjerison (n 12) 305.  See, for example section 12J of the Income Tax Act 58 of 
1962 which provides a tax benefit to investors in some types of early stage growth companies. 
34 Huang, Chiu, Mo and Marjerison (n 12) 314. 
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4. CROWDFUNDING IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
The United States model of equity crowdfunding, which provides an exemption under 
the United States of America's Securities Act, 1933 for issuers a pursuant to the federal 
Jumpstart Our Business Starts Act35 (the "JOBS Act"), envisages three main actors in 
an equity crowdfunding transaction.36  The first is the entity that seeks to raise funds 
from the public (the issuer), the second is the platform through which the funds will be 
raised (the platform) and the third is the party that seeks to invest in the issuer (the 
investor).37  The model introduced by the JOBS Act is not the only model applicable in 
the United States, as different States within that country have introduced their own 
requirements and models for crowdfunding.  
The JOBS Act has restrictions on who may act as crowdfunded and also restrains the 
extent to which individuals may invest in platforms.38  Generally, any company may be 
an issuer under the regime provided for by the JOBS Act, crowdfunded although issuers 
are required to disclose to the Securities and Exchange Commission (for publication) 
certain prescribed information, as well as any other information as may be required by 
the SEC in order to protect investors or serve the public interest.39   
Issuers, who must be domestic companies of the United States,40 are also required to 
interact with the general public only through the SEC or the platform, as applicable.41  
An interesting, but not altogether unique, feature of the crowdfunding regulation in the 
United States is that platforms are tasked with educating and protecting investors by 
ensuring that investors are aware of, and understand, the risks of crowdfunding 
investment.42   
                                               
35 Public Law No 112-106, 126 Stat. 306. 
36 Rubock "The Risk of Money Laundering Through Crowdfunding: A Funding Portal's Guide to 
Compliance and Crime Fighting" 2014 Michigan Business and Entrepreneurial Law Review 115. 
37 s 302 of the JOBS Act which introduces amendments to the United States Securities Act of 1993 which 
exempts certain platforms from having to comply with some provisions of the Securities Act of 1993. 
38 Rubock (n 36) 116. 
39 s4A(b)(1)(I) of the Securities Act of 1933.  
40 Rubock (n 36) 117.  
41 s4A(b)(2) to (5) of the Securities Act of 1933.   Schwartz "Keep It Light, Chairman White: SEC 
Rulemaking Under the Crowdfund Act" 2014 Vanderbilt Law Review En Banc 43 51. 
42 s 302 of the JOBS Act. 
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Platforms are not permitted to offer investment advice or hold investor funds in trust,43 
however they are required to take measures to reduce the risk of fraud being perpetuated 
by an issuer, including through conducting limited issuer due diligence.44  That the 
JOBS Act only requires limited issuer due diligence to be undertaken is understandable 
as not only does this keep the costs of accessing crowdfunding minimal, but it also takes 
into account that many businesses that will make use of crowdfunding are early stage or 
untested businesses which require funding from unconventional sources in order to 
incubate or test the models upon which such businesses are based.45   
5. CROWDFUNDING IN CHINA 
The model prescribed by the JOBS Act in the United States of America is similar to the 
general practice in China,46 although there are some notable nuances in the Chinese 
model.   
The first is that platforms in China are not standalone entities, they are intrinsically 
connected with e-commerce platforms and virtual payment solutions, which ensures that 
access to financial markets to raise funding is linked with access to a customer base in 
order to facilitate product offtake and enhance the bankability of an issuer.47   
The second nuance is that as opposed to conventional crowdfunding involving only the 
issuer, the platform and the investor, the Chinese model involved a fourth participant.  
This participant plays a role in facilitating the crowdfunding transaction and is normally 
commissioned by an issuer.  The typical functions that this party would assume include 
managing the investment on behalf of investors (which may even entail such party 
exercising the rights in the issuer that an investor normally would thereby assume the 
role of a proxy or representative shareholder).48   
The third nuance is the possible syndication of investors into a single vehicle, which 
will be tasked with making a direct investment in an issuer,49 and the fourth nuance 
                                               
43 s 304 of the JOBS Act. 
44 s 302 of the JOBS Act. 
45 Huang, Chiu, Mo and Marjerison (n 12) 313. 
46 Huang, Chiu, Mo and Marjerison (n 12) 313. 
47 Huang, Chiu, Mo and Marjerison (n 12) 315. 
48 Li J "Equity Crowdfunding in China: Current Practice and Important Legal Issues" 2016 The Asian 
Business Lawyer 64. 
49 Li (n 48) 63. 
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being the availability of a licensed exchange that serves (in theory) as an exit 
mechanism for investors thereby ensuring that investments made in an issuer are not 
illiquid.50  
In the syndication model, investors participate in a crowdfunding venture on the basis of 
their trust in a lead investor (who is tasked with making the decision to invest in an 
issuer and also assembling the syndicate in order to scale the investment).51  While the 
lead investor is required to invest in the issuer on the same terms as the crowd, the lead 
investor does not have to invest through a platform or through the syndication vehicle 
and is rather required to disclose to investors how it votes on matters pertaining to the 
issuer and also disclose the details of any transaction in which it buys additional shares 
or disposes of shares.52  There is also a practice in China (although seemingly not well 
developed) of using either voting pool-type arrangements (that each investor can accede 
to) or of organising by way of a limited liability partnership as opposed to using a 
company as a vehicle for syndication.   
6. POSSIBLE MODELS FOR CROWDFUNDING GLEANED FROM THE 
PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND CHINA  
The models observed in the United States of America and China focus on the role of a 
platform as a catalyst for connecting the offerors and acquirers of shares.  Even though 
practice in China goes further than providing only for a platform that connects offerors 
and acquirers of shares, the role played by a platform in China remains similar to that 
played by a platform in the United States.   
The Chinese model provides (at least ostensibly) for additional safeguards for investors 
through the presence, altogether apart from the platform, of a party that facilitates the 
crowdfunding transaction and exercises rights on behalf of the investors.  The Chinese 
model also provides for the investment by members of the public through a syndicate 
which may at first blush appear to be an additional layer in the crowdfunding model 
however, if considered in the totality of the scheme within which it operates, it may be a 
separate expression of the platform model in that investors ultimately invest in the 
                                               
50 Li (n 48)  64. 
51 Li (n 48) 73. 
52 Li (n 48) 74. 
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syndicate (and not in an underlying issuer) as their gateway to having exposure to 
crowdfunded assets.  
The impact of South African law on a crowdfunding model will therefore depend 
largely on the role that is played by the platform.  To this end, three models are 
considered in the light of current South African law and depending on the extent of a 
platform's participation in the crowdfunding process: (i) the issuer uses the platform as a 
mechanism to make offers to the public, the only role played by the platform will be the 
dissemination of information to members of the public - the platform therefore serves as 
a marketplace for connecting investors and issuers ("passive platform model"); (ii) the 
platform serves as a marketplace for connecting investors and issuers, however it is 
tasked (similarly to the model in the United States of America under the JOBS Act) 
with undertaking limited issuer due diligence, facilitating the disclosure of information 
by issuers to investors and ensuring that investor funds are not disbursed until the 
fundraising target of an issuer has been reached ("active platform model");  and (iii) 
investors' discretion in which issuers to invest in is constrained (whether voluntarily or 
institutionally) and investors essentially make their investment decision on the basis of 
their trust in an established and experienced entity that pools the funds of investors and 
invests them in issuers ("fund model").  For present purposes, the nuances between the 
Chinese syndication model and the Fund Model are not explored further as the Chinese 
model, properly construed, would fall either within the passive platform model or the 
active platform model. 
7. PASSIVE PLATFORM MODEL 
7.1 Making an offer to the public 
An important feature of equity crowdfunding, depending on the model that is followed, 
is that it involves the offering of securities to members of the public.53  Chapter 4 of the 
Companies Act broadly defines an offer to the public to include any offer of securities 
to be issued to any section of the public.54  In order for these provisions to apply, an 
offer must have been made to the public an invitation to solicit an offer would not 
suffice.  The Companies Act does not provide a helpful definition of what constitutes an 
                                               
53 Sing "Regulation of Equity Crowdfunding in Singapore" 2015 Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 46 
47; Huang, Chiu, Mo and Marjerison (n 12) 309; Li (n 48) 61. 
54 s 95(1)(h). 
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offer,55 it does, however, provide that an offer can be made in any way, therefore an 
offer made electronically or through an intermediary would constitute an offer for 
purposes of Chapter 4 of the Companies Act.56  In order to ascertain what constitutes an 
offer, the principles espoused by common law must be followed.57  It is trite that in 
order to constitute an offer, a statement must be an unambiguous expression of an 
intention to contract which, if accepted, would give rise to a binding agreement.58 
The broad59 definition of what constitutes the public is intended, subject to the 
exceptions provided for by the Companies Act, to bring within the ambit of regulation 
all instances where an offer is made and there is no prior connection between the offeror 
and the offerrees60 and reflect the reasoning of Nugent JA in Gold Fields v Harmony 
Gold:61 
"To qualify as an offer to the public it would seem to me that the terms of the offer 
would at least need to be capable of being offered to and accepted by the public at 
large….  But an offer that is made to the public would necessarily be in terms that 
would enable it to be made to and accepted by the public at large, and it could thus 
be made with indifference to any random section of the public. An offer to sell 
shares, for example, in return for cash, is capable of being made to the public at 
large, and might thus be made as much to that section of the public that resides in 
Bloemfontein as to the section of the public that resides in Upington."62 
The purpose of this broad definition is ensuring that all persons to whom offers are 
made are entitled to obtain, by way of a prospectus or a written statement, sufficient 
information to enable them to assess the merits of the offer63 and ultimately make a 
decision as to whether the offer is one they wish to accept.64   
Excluded from the scope of what constitutes an offer to the public is an offer under 
circumstances set out in section 96 of the Companies Act, as well as a secondary offer 
                                               
55 s 95(1)(g). 
56 Delport (ed) Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (2019) 364. See also, generally, the 
Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002. 
57 Delport (n 56) 364. 
58 Van Jaarsveld v Ackermann 1975 2 SA 753 (A) at 757D. 
59 Delport (n 56) 364. 
60 Delport (n 56) 366. 
61 Gold Fields Limited v Harmony Gold Mining Company Limited 2005 (2) SA 506 (SCA). 
62 Gold Fields (n 61) paras 13 and 14.  
63 s 100(2)(a) 
64 Delport (n 56) 365. 
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(being an offer made by a third party of the securities of an issuer)65 is excluded by 
section 96 as it is made through an exchange.66   
The exceptions from an offer to the public provided for by section 96 of the Companies 
Act apply to persons who are regarded as not requiring a prospectus in order to make 
their investment decision, such persons are therefore already in possession of the 
information that they would require in order to make an investment decision or are 
reasonably able to acquire it.67   
Among these persons are those whose ordinary business is to deal in securities,68 the 
Public Investment Corporation SOC Limited,69 banks, pension funds and financial 
services providers,70 existing holders of the issuer's securities and persons related to 
such existing holders,71 qualified investors (i.e. persons who intend to invest a minimum 
of one million Rand (or such other amount not less than R100,000 as may be 
prescribed) to acquire securities made pursuant to the offer),72 employees of the issuer 
pursuant to an employee share scheme73 or directors or prescribed officers of the 
issuer,74 or an offer which, in the aggregate seeks to raise a maximum of a million Rand 
(or such other amount not less than R100,000 as may be prescribed) and complies with 
certain restrictions contained in the Companies Act (a "small cap offer").75 
The making of a secondary offer  through an exchange is regulated by the Financial 
Markets Act (FMA)76 while the making of a secondary offer through informal markets 
is regulated by Chapter 4 of the Companies Act, however the information required to be 
                                               
65 s 95(1)(m). 
66 s 95(1)(h). 
67 Delport (n 56) 365. 
68 s 96(1)(a)(i). 
69 s 96(1)(a)(ii). 
70 s 96(1)(a)(iii) to (vi). 
71 s 96(1)(c).  To the extent that the offer is made only to such persons or their related parties and is not 
renounceable.  An offer is non-renounceable if it is only capable of being accepted by the person to 
whom it is made.  See Cassim FHI (ed) Contemporary Company Law (2011) 596. 
72 s 96(1)(b). 
73 s 96(1)(e). 
74 s 96(1)(f). To the extent that the offer is made only to such persons or their related parties and is not 
renounceable. 
75 s 96(1)(g). 
76 19 of 2012. See also s 101(2). 
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disclosed in making such offer is substantially less than that required for primary 
offers.77 
In order to achieve efficiencies of cost and time, issuers will either have to craft their 
offerings in a manner that fits within the exceptions provided for in the Companies Act, 
or comply with the provisions pertaining to offers made to the public.  The time and 
expense associated with making an offer to the public that is not exempt relate mostly to 
the requirement that an issuer of securities to the public accompany such offer with a 
registered prospectus.78  An alternative to producing a prospectus would be making the 
primary offer by way of an advertisement that contains all of the information that the 
Companies Act requires to be contained in a prospectus.79  This too, however, is likely 
to be a costly exercise. 
A prospectus is required to contain all the information that an investor may reasonably 
require to assess the assets and liabilities, financial position, profits and losses, cash 
flow and prospects of the company in which a right or interest is to be acquired, and to 
assess the securities being offered and rights attaching to them.80  An issuer may apply 
to the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (the "Commission") for 
permission to exclude information that is required to be disclosed in a prospectus.81  
This exemption may only be granted by the Commission in limited instances82 and 
provided that the omission of such information would not unduly prejudice a potential 
investor.83  This potential exemption is useful, but does not go far enough in expediting 
the process to be followed by issuers as an application must be undertaken on a case by 
case basis,84 compounded by the fact that the Commission is not time bound in 
                                               
77 s 101(6). 
78 s 99(2). 
79 s 98(1). 
80 s 100(2)(a).  As an alternative to issuing a prospectus and for secondary offers, the person disposing of 
the securities could make use of a previously issued prospectus (updated with any material changes in 
the condition of the company) or by way of a written statement, the contents of which will be far less 
onerous than a prospectus (s 99(2), 99(3) and 101(2).  Given that the focus of this dissertation is 
fundraising activity by issuers, options which can be used by the issuer for fundraising (as opposed to 
those open to an investor for exit) are focussed on.  
81 s 100(9). 
82 That is, where the publication of the information would be unnecessarily burdensome on the issuer, 
cause serious detriment to the issuer or be against the public interest. 
83 s 100(9)(b). 
84 s 6(2). 
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considering an application and is not empowered to provide a general exemption to all 
issuers.85 
Due to the nature of crowdfunding being such that a relatively small amount of money 
is raised from a large number of investors, the only exception to the definition of an 
offer to the public that is likely to apply to an issuer is the making of a small cap offer. 
Unlike the other exceptions from an offer to the public whose purpose is to not require 
the publication of a prospectus for sophisticated investors or persons who are expected 
to have knowledge of the affairs of an issuer (or at least be in a position to ascertain the 
condition of the issuer as a result of being "insiders"),86 the purpose of the small cap 
offer provisions (which are almost a restatement of the provisions of section 144(c) of 
the Companies Act 61 of 1973) is to ensure that a private placement that raises a small 
amount of money does not have to comply with the requirement to produce a 
prospectus.87 
In order to qualify as a small cap offer, an offer (or the series of offers of which it forms 
part) must be made in writing, not be accompanied by or made by means of an 
advertisement, not incur any selling expenses, be finalised within six months of the date 
that it was first made, be accepted by no more than 50 persons acting as principals and 
not seek to raise more than one million Rand as currently prescribed under Reg 45(2) of 
the Companies Act.88  The issuer must also not have made another offer (or series of 
offers) within an immediately prior period of 12 months as currently prescribed under 
Reg 45(1) of the Companies Act. 
The structuring of crowdfunding investment by issuers as small cap offers could 
potentially be the ideal way for the Passive Platform Model to assist with connecting 
issuers and investors.  A small cap offer could be made by an issuer every 12 months,89 
thereby providing a steady stream for meeting its medium term working capital 
requirements.  
                                               
85 s 6(2). 
86 Delport (n 56) 365. 
87 Blackman Commentary on the Companies Act (2002) Ch6-11. 
88 s 96(1)(g). 
89 Yeats "Public offerings of company securities: a closer look at certain aspects of chapter 4 of the 
Companies Act, 71 of 2008" 2010 Acta Juridica 117 123. 
  14 
The requirements of section 96(1)(g) are not onerous and platforms could assist in 
ensuring that offers raise the currently maximum permissible amount (one million 
Rand) from up to 50 investors acting as principals, that investors are refunded for any 
offers which are not finalised within six months and provided that platform fees are 
charged to the investors and not the issuer (so that no selling expenses are incurred by 
the issuer).  Any primary offer which falls outside the scope of this exception (and is not 
otherwise excluded from the ambit of an offer to the public) would have to be 
accompanied by a registered prospectus.  Non-compliance with this requirement (for 
example by an issuer using more than one platform to raise more than the prescribed  
caps raise funds from more than 50 people, or therefore undertaking more than one offer 
in the prescribed 12 month period) would be an issuer risk as the issue allotment would 
be void non-compliance with the law thus entitling all investors to be refunded the 
amount of their subscriptions. 
Despite the apparent ease with which an issuer may be able to comply with section 
96(1)(g), an aspect of this exemption that warrants closer inspection is the requirement 
that, in order to qualify as a small cap offer, the offer (and any other offer within the 
same series of offers) may not be accompanied by or made by means of an 
advertisement.  The small cap offer provisions are often used as a mechanism to make 
offers to a limited number of persons who have a prior connection with the issuer.  For 
this reason an advertisement is generally not required to be made to them in order to 
communicate the terms of the offer. 
The Companies Act defines an advertisement quite broadly as: 
"any direct or indirect communication transmitted by any medium, or any representation or 
reference written, inscribed, recorded, encoded upon or embedded within any medium, by 
means of which a person seeks to bring any information to the attention of all or part of the 
public." 
An issuer setting up a website or placing an advert on a website, newspaper or online 
catalogue would most certainly amount to an advert, although it is not clear whether an 
online platform established for the purposes of providing members of the public with 
access to crowdfunding opportunities would be caught by the broad definition.  It is also 
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not clear whether the person bringing information to the attention of the public need 
necessarily be the issuer or whether the platform may qualify as such person.90 
The word "advertisement" has not been the subject of much judicial interpretation 
although the case law on this point suggests that an advert is made by a person who 
intends for the public to come to the knowledge of such information91 and that merely 
making known the existence of an opportunity would not necessarily constitute an 
advertisement.92  It may therefore be possible for potential issuers to approach platforms 
to assist them with their fundraising and, if the platforms have discretion on whether or 
not to list any particular issue, the approach to platforms by an issuer would not be an 
advert (and consequently not an offer to the public).  This would also be so if the 
approach by an issuer to the platform is not an offer but rather a means by which the 
issuer invites potential investors to consider subscribing for shares in the issuer.93  
Platforms would, in turn, make known to the public the availability of opportunities to 
invest in issuers on their portal (however without promoting or endorsing any particular 
offer by an issuer as this may be regarded the provision of "advice" in relation to the 
subscription - with potential consequences under FAIS and the FMA). 
7.2 Limitations imposed by the type of company  
The Companies Act recognises two primary forms of privately owned profit companies, 
public and private companies.  There is no requirement in Chapter 4 of the Companies 
Act that an offer to the public be made by a public company,94 however, in order to 
qualify as a private company, the memorandum of incorporation of a company must 
restrict the transferability of the securities of the company and prohibit the company 
from offering its securities to the public.95   
                                               
90 Under the JOBS Act an issuer is bared from directly promoting its own crowdfunded security, however 
it may appoint an outside promoter to do so provided that the compensation to be paid to the 
promoter (and the manner of its calculation) is disclosed to the SEC. See Schwartz (n41) 53. 
91 R v Hees 1944 1 PH D7 (T). 
92 R v Alexander 1954 3 SA 383 (N) at 387D. 
93 Delport (n 56) 54(13).  The issuer would have to ensure, that the terms of the invitation are such that 
their mere acceptance would give rise to a contract. 
94 s 99(1)(a). 
95 s 8(2). 
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Unlike the Companies Act 61 of 1973 the current Companies Act does not restrict the 
number of shareholders of a private company to fifty.96 That profit companies may have 
an unlimited number of shareholders97 aides in the permissibility of using the small cap 
offer mechanism for crowdfunding.  Although the Companies Act should limit a private 
company's ability to make use of the small cap offer in order to ensure that fundraising 
using this mechanism does not continue in perpetuity or cause the company to have an 
unmanageable number of shareholders.98 
The common ways in which the transferability of securities may be restricted is through 
the memorandum of incorporation of a company providing for pre-emptive rights on the 
sale of the securities of the company99 and the transfer of securities of the company 
having to be authorised by the board of that company, although any other restriction 
would suffice for this purpose.100 
It is not altogether clear whether a company that makes an offer that, but for the 
application of the exemptions provided for in section 96(1), would be regarded as an 
"offer to the public" will be considered a private company for purposes of the 
Companies Act other than Chapter 4. Some authors contend that given that the word 
"public" is not defined generally in the Companies Act and the definition of "offer to the 
public" in section 95 only applies to Chapter 4 of the Companies Act, the word "public" 
must, except when used in Chapter 4, be given its ordinary grammatical meaning.101 
This anomaly, which is a carry-over from the Companies Act 61 of 1973,102 should be 
addressed either by an appropriate amendment of the Companies Act or through an 
exemption being granted by the Commission.  The classification of a crowdfunding 
entity as a private company is important as it will minimise the costs of operating the 
entity.103  Private companies (save to the extent that they are required by their 
                                               
96 s 20 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
97 Cassim (n 71) 69. 
98 This could be achieved through limiting the number of shareholders, adding number of 8 hours to 
calculation of public interest score or cap amount raised in this way. 
99 This should be distinguished from the pre-emptive rights on the issue of securities of the company, as 
provided for in s 39(2). 
100 Cassim (n 71) 71. 
101 Delport (n 56) 54(12). 
102 Delport (n 56) 54(12). 
103 Cassim (n 71) 67. 
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memorandum of incorporation or the Companies Act)104 do not have to comply with the 
enhanced accountability and transparency requirements provided for by the Companies 
Act.105 
By way of illustration, public companies106 are required to appoint an auditor,107 have an 
audit committee108 and also appoint a company secretary109 (except if it is a subsidiary 
of a company that has an audit committee and such other company's audit committee 
will also serve as the audit company of the subsidiary company).110  Making these 
requirements applicable to issuers would increase the compliance costs of their 
operation and potentially erode the benefits that a small cap offer would provide to 
issuers.   
7.3 Financial services regulation 
Apart from the Companies Act, the offering of, or trading in securities by any persons in 
South Africa is governed by the Collective Investment Schemes Control Act 45 of 2002 
(CISCA), the FMA, the Banks Act 31 of 1920 (Banks Act) and the Financial Advisory 
and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002.  Of these, the CISCA and FMA are most 
relevant to crowdfunding.   
The Banks Act will not be relevant to the general scheme of crowdfunding as none of 
the actors in the transaction will be required to apply for licensing111, and register,112 
under the Banks Act as they will not be conducting the business of a bank which 
primarily relates to the acceptance of cash deposits from members of the public.113  
It is typical of platforms in the United States of America and China to receive monies 
from the public and only disburse such funds to an issuer once the crowdfunding target 
has been met.  While it may be argued that this constitutes taking deposits from the 
                                               
104 Private companies which are deemed sufficiently large enough, due to their public interest score, will 
have to comply with these requirements. S 28(2)(c). 
105 s 84(1).  
106 As well as the private companies described in n 104. 
107 s 90.  Although some private companies must be audited 
108 s 84(4)(c). 
109 s86(1). 
110 s 94(2). 
111 s 12(1) of the Banks Act. 
112 s 17 of the Banks Act. 
113 Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Minister of Bantu Education 1966 1 SA 229 (N) at 476. 
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public, the Banks Act expressly excludes from the definition of "deposit" the taking of 
money as an advance in terms of a contract of sale and that is refundable in the event 
that a resolutive or suspensive condition forming part of that contract of sale is not 
met.114  
The FAIS Act will also not be rarely relevant in the crowdfunding context as FAIS 
regulates the rendering of financial advisory and intermediary services (financial 
services) to clients.  It is not envisaged that an issuer or a platform will, in the ordinary 
course, provide financial advice to investors in connection with their investment.  None 
of the models observed in the other jurisdictions provide for any advisory services being 
provided in relation to the crowdfunded securities and it is unlikely that any advice 
would be provided issuers and investors by a Platform. 
The FMA regulates the manner in which the trading of securities takes place.  Two 
questions arise as regards the application of the FMA to the Passive Platform model.  
The first is whether the platform under this model can be regarded as an exchange and 
the second is whether the Passive Platform model necessitates to the provision of 
securities services. 
The FMA defines an exchange as a person who constitutes, maintains and provides 
infrastructure for bringing together buyers and sellers of securities.115  As envisaged, the 
Passive Platform Model does not fall within this definition as its primary purpose would 
be to facilitate the investment in an issuer by subscription and not sale.  Further, in the 
event that an issuer is a private company, its securities will not fall within the definition 
of "securities" contained in the FMA as only securities of public companies are caught 
by that definition.  This notwithstanding, the Registrar of Securities Services is entitled 
to designate an instrument similar to a security of a public company as a security for 
                                               
114 s 1 of the Banks Act.  Whilst a subscription is not, per se, a sale it does (non the less) meet the 
common law definitional requirements (essentialia) of a sale (i.e. the delivery of a merx in return for 
consideration). 
115 s 1 of the FMA.  The question of how to provide for an exit from a crowdfunding investment is not 
one which has been discussed at length by commentators or addressed in the crowdfunding regulation 
in the United States of America and China.  One exit mechanism which has emerged, however, in 
China is a dedicated exchange which facilitates exit for such investors from their investments.  
Should a Passive Platform extend its operations from facilitating subscription into an issuer to 
providing an exit mechanism or facilitating secondary market activity, it would fall within the 
definition of an exchange.  For an issuer's securities to be traded on an exchange would, however, 
require that the issuer relax any restrictions it has in place on the transferability of its securities with 
the consequence that the issuer comply with the enhanced accountability requirements applicable to 
public companies under the Companies Act. 
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purposes of the FMA.  To date private company securities have not been so designated, 
however this power may be exercised in the interests of protecting investors, which is a 
fundamental tenet of financial regulation.116   
Whether a platform provides securities services depends largely on whether the 
securities of an issuer will be regarded securities for the purposes of the FMA.  If they 
are not so regarded, the activities of a platform provider will fall outside the definition 
of securities services.  In the event that they are, it remains unlikely that the platform in 
a Passive Platform Model will be providing any advice on securities, managing 
securities on behalf of investors or buying and selling securities for its own account or 
as part of its business, Therefore consequences under the FMA are unlikely to arise. 
8. ACTIVE PLATFORM MODEL 
The considerations applicable to the passive platform model will apply to the Active 
Platform Model.  However, the role played by the platform provider may make some of 
the provisions of the FMA applicable, particularly if the platform provider gives 
recommendations or guidance in relation to the issuer or its securities.  Doing so would 
bring its conduct within the ambit of FAIS and the FMA, requiring licensing under this 
legislation. 
This will also be so in the event that the platform provider under the Active Platform 
Model purchases and sells securities issued by issuers (but would not necessarily be the 
case if the issuer merely co-invests with investors as is the case in China where 
investors sometimes make their investment decisions based on the investment decisions 
of a lead investor).  
A possible iteration of the platform model could be where a platform evaluates, for its 
own account, securities proposed to be issued by an issuer and purchases such securities 
for its own account.  These securities could then be sold by a platform provider to the 
public by way of secondary offers.  If sold by public auction or public bidding on the 
platform the platform provider would not have to produce a prospectus or prepare a 
written statement in relation to such securities.117   
                                               
116 Van Wyk, Botha and Goodspeed Understanding South African Financial Markets (2012) 113. 
117 s 101(3)(a)(ii). 
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The above model, however, would bring a platform provider within the remit of the 
FMA as although an exchange would not be operated,118 the platform provider would be 
undertaking securities services (by buying and selling securities for its own account as 
part of its business).  Given that one of the objects of the FMA is to ensure that 
securities services are provided in a fair, efficient and transparent manner119 this model 
would be the subject of regulatory scrutiny, requiring licensing under the FMA and 
compliance with prescribed conduct requirements.120 
9. FUND MODEL 
The fund model is materially different to the active platform model and the passive 
platform model in that it involves investments being made by members of the public 
into a fund established for the purposes of investing in issuers.  The decision whether to 
invest in an issuer will be made by the platform - members of the public will therefore 
obtain exposure to issuers through a platform and have no say on the issuers in which 
they invest (other than through to decisions of the platform on the fact that an issuer 
which would disclose in terms of holdings or asset allocation. 
Under the Fund Model considerations of an issuer making an offer to the public are 
unlikely to arise as the offer to subscribe for securities would be made by the fund 
manager (being the platform operator under the Fund Model).  Depending on how the 
platform operator of a Fund Model is organised, there could be consequences under 
CISCA (and possibly also under the FMA). 
CISCA regulates collective investment schemes which it defines as a scheme through 
which members of the public are invited or permitted to invest money or other assets in 
a portfolio in return for which they receive a participatory interest in the portfolio which 
allows them to proportionately share in the risk and benefit of the investments 
underlying the portfolio.121 
                                               
118 Given that in this model the platform would be selling securities for its own account and not 
facilitating secondary market activity. 
119 s 2(b)(i) of the FMA. Luiz and van der Linde "The Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012: Some 
Comments on the Regulation of Market Abuse" 2013 South African Mercantile Law Journal 458 
458. 
120 s 6(7) of the FMA. 
121 s 1 of CISCA. 
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CISCA generally provides for three broad categories of collective investment schemes 
as designated in accordance with their underlying asset portfolios.  A collective 
investment scheme may either be a collective investment scheme in securities (if the 
portfolio in which it is invested consists mainly of securities),122 a collective investment 
scheme in property (if the portfolio consists of property shares or immovable 
property),123 or a collective investment in participation bonds (if its portfolio mainly 
consists of participation bonds).124  Given that the purpose of facilitating crowdfunding 
should be to provide small and medium South African enterprises with capital, foreign 
collective investment schemes will not be considered. 
A platform provider under the Fund Model would necessarily be purchasing securities 
issued by issuers therefore the provisions relating to investment schemes in securities 
would be applicable.  CISCA does not define what a "security" is, however the 
Registrar of Collective Investment Schemes is entitled to designate securities or classes 
of securities which may form part of a collective investment scheme portfolio,125 and 
impose any further conditions and limits upon the investments made by a collective 
investment scheme.126  The purpose of these limitations is the protection of investors.127 
The Registrar of Collective Investment Schemes has determined, as a general matter, 
that collective investment schemes in securities may only invest in shares in public 
companies128 and, if the company has a market capitalisation of less than R2 billion, the 
collective investment scheme may invest up to the lesser of 5% of the scheme assets in, 
or 5% of the shares of, such company.129  At least 90% of the market value of a 
portfolio held by a collective investment scheme must consist of securities traded on an 
exchange and financial instruments which are liquid.130 
                                               
122 s 39 of CISCA. 
123 s 47 of CISCA. 
124 s 52 of CISCA. 
125 s 40 of CISCA. 
126 Strydom N.O. and Others v Bakkes and Another 2014 4 SA 29 (GP) at par. 11. 
127 Strydom N.O. and Others v Bakkes and Another 2014 4 SA 29 (GP) at par. 15. 
128 GG No. 37895 BN 90 of 8 August 2014 at par 1. 
129 GG No. 37895 BN 90 of 8 August 2014 at par 3(1). 
130 GG No. 37895 BN 90 of 8 August 2014. 
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The Registrar is empowered to exempt any person from these requirements,131 and the 
Minister of Finance may exempt any person from the application of a provision of 
CISCA, however this will be done where the Minister or the Registrar (as the case may 
be) are satisfied that it would not lead to investor protection concerns.   
Other than the requirement that a collective investment scheme invest only in the shares 
of public companies,132 there is nothing restricting or prohibiting a collective investment 
scheme from investing in issuers.  The scheme designed for collective investments is, 
however, not altogether suitable for the investment in issuers.  This is due to the fact 
that the design of collective investment schemes (with the requirement that both a 
trustee and manager must be appointed to undertake the various administration tasks 
relating to the scheme)133 makes it an expensive structure to establish and maintain.134   
The investment by collective investment schemes in a number of as they have a high 
failure rate issuers would not only increase the administration costs of the scheme, but 
may not attain the advantage of a collective investment scheme (being the reduction of 
asset risk through diversification) as entities undertaking crowdfunding are considered 
high risk.135  The compliance cost of operating as a collective investment scheme may 
therefore not have a commensurate benefit for a Fund Model platform operator.  This is 
particularly so as a participatory interest in a collective investment scheme would 
amount to a security under the FMA, with the effect that the manager of the collective 
scheme and the trustee of such scheme would have to comply with the requirements of 
the FMA (as they would be engaged in the business of buying and selling securities and 
therefore providing securities services).  In addition to complying with CISCA. 
The investment by a collective investment scheme in issuers would also create practical 
difficulties with a legislative impact.  Given the illiquid nature of crowdfunded 
securities and the high failure rate of small businesses (being the issuers most likely to 
have recourse to crowdfunding, the ability of a manager of a collective investment 
                                               
131 s 22 of CISCA. 
132 Which, it is hoped, issuers will not have to be as the compliance requirements for public companies 
under the Companies Act can be onerous. 
133 s 68(1) of CISCA. 
134 See, for example, s 93(1) of CISCA which sets out all of the permissible charges that can be levied by 
a manager. 
135 Van Wyk, Botha and Goodspeed (n 116) 184. 
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scheme to comply with capital maintenance136 and liquidity137 requirements would be 
severely constrained. 
Evident from the foregoing discussion is that a collective investment scheme does not 
neatly fit within the scheme for crowdfunding, for this reason this mechanism for 
facilitating crowdfunding will not be considered further.  
10. PROTECTING THE ROLEPLAYERS IN CROWDFUNDING 
10.1 The potential risks in crowdfunding 
An important consideration for crowdfunding regulation is how investors will be 
protected.  By their nature, crowdfunding investments have a number of risks which 
must be taken into account. 138  The risks are split between those relating to the issuer 
(requiring the investor to be safeguarded), those relating to the investor (requiring other 
investors and/or the issuer to be safeguarded) and those relating to the platform.139  
The exact extent of these risks, and their potential mitigation depend, to a large degree 
on the characterisation of the issuer (i.e. whether it is a public or a private company) and 
the role played by the platform.  Given the possible regulatory impacts of an Active 
Platform Model under the FMA and the challenges that would come with an Active 
Platform Model operator taking risk in the shares of an issuer, it is unlikely that this 
model would work.  It is therefore likely that a Passive Platform Model would be more 
suited for the development of a crowdfunding market in South Africa.  The risks of 
crowdfunding are hence evaluated in the light of this model. 
                                               
136 s 88(1) and 89(1) of CISCA. 
137 s 96 of CISCA. 
138 Sing (n 53) 47. 
139 Sing (n 53) 60. 
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10.2 Mitigating issuer risks  
Among the biggest risks pertaining to issuers are the high failure rate of early stage 
businesses, asymmetries of information between the investor and issuer, and the lack of 
liquidity of crowdfunding securities.140  
The high failure rate of early stage businesses  
There are a number of factors that could lead to the failure of an early stage business.  
What any crowdfunding regulation should seek to do is mitigate the factors that arise 
under corporate law.  The most important of these will relate to the governance of an 
issuer, which refers to the manner in which the issuer is controlled and how its day to 
day operations are conducted.141  It is trite that the day to day operations of a company 
must be undertaken under the control of the board of directors, save to the extent that 
the memorandum of incorporation of that company provides otherwise.142   
Having crowdfunding investors obtain direct representation on the board may be a 
difficult and sometimes impractical exercise.  As an alternative to the level of 
participation by investors, the issuer could be required to disclose the identity of its 
board of directors (as well as the skills and qualifications of such persons) as part of the 
process of raising funds.  Any change in these persons would have to be notified to the 
crowdfunding investors.   
Furthermore, the memorandum of incorporation of the issuer could also provide 
safeguards that lock in the disclosed purpose of the issuer including by restricting the 
issuer's powers to conducting only the business disclosed to potential investors,143 
thereby prohibiting any amendment of the memorandum of incorporation of the issuer 
without the approval of the and the investors and setting out matters (including the 
adoption or amendment of a budget and business plan for the issuer) that would require 
the approval of the majority of the investors. 
                                               
140 Sing (n 53) 60 and 61. 
141 Head of Department, Department Of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High School; Head Of 
Department, Department Of Education, Free State Province v Harmony High School 2014 2 SA 228 
(CC) at par. 60.  
142 s 66(1). 
143 s 15(2)(b). 
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Asymmetries of information between the investor and issuer 
A useful tool for investor protection is the requirement that an issuer make disclosure of 
material matters when offering securities to the public,144 and also on an ongoing basis 
thereafter.145  Disclosure should not be an exercise in identifying all relevant matters 
and should be restricted to matters which are absolutely required to be disclosed.  This 
is important as the more extensive the disclosure requirements are (and the more 
extensive the disclosures) the more expensive the offer process will be and the less 
likely that investors will actually read the disclosures.146 
The directors of a company would be liable for the contents of any document that they 
sign or that is published on their behalf, irrespective of whether or not they actually 
know the contents of the document; what matters is that they create a reasonable 
impression to third parties that the document is accurate and can be relied upon.147 
In the event that an issuer is required to produce a prospectus, it could be required to file 
a short form prospectus with the Commission in a form prescribed specifically for 
issuers.148  This short form prospectus could cover the matters prescribed by Regulation 
72(1) of the Companies Act, as well as a few additional matters (guidance for which can 
be obtained under the JOBS Act)149 including the names, qualifications and experience 
of the directors and officers of the issuer, a description of the issuer's business, business 
plan and key customers and suppliers, the income tax returns and management accounts 
or audited financials (depending on the size of the offer), the intended use of the 
proceeds of the offer, the target offer amount as well as the minimum offer amount,150 
and the method used to determine the offer price of the securities offered. 
In addition to the disclosure of these matters, the issuer should be required to report (at 
each annual general meeting of the company) on the progress made in achieving the 
business plan and also present financial statements. 
                                               
144 Van der Linde "The Personal Liability of Directors for Corporate Fault - An Exploration" 2008 South 
African Mercantile Law Journal 439 446. 
145 Schwartz (n 41) 45. 
146 Schwartz (n 41) 46. 
147 Delport (392). 
148 s 100(2)(b). 
149 s 300(2)(b) of the JOBS Act. 
150 s 108(2). 
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In the event that the issuer is not required to produce a prospectus  the issuer could be 
required to file a statement setting out matters similar to those that would be provided 
for in an issuer's prospectus.  Since, it is argued, the private placement should only 
occur through a platform, the platform provider would have to undertake limited due 
diligence in order to satisfy itself of the contents of the written statement (in particular 
that it does not contain any glaring inconsistencies or misrepresentations, and covers all 
matters required by a reasonable investor to make a decision on the offer). 
Lack of liquidity  
Although the structure of a crowdfunded entity (widely held issuer, platform and 
investor) is similar to that of a listed entity, the difference in the pricing of the risk of 
investing on the stock market and an issuer presents some challenges.  The risk of 
investing in a listed entity is reflected in the share price which in turn responds to the 
knowledge and expectations of professional advisors.151  This provides a natural 
safeguard against a company issuing shares at a price that is too high or too low. 
The problem of a lack of liquidity of shares is a common problem encountered by 
unlisted companies (particularly private companies with a limited shareholder base).  
This is compounded by the fact that ability (and expertise) of crowdfunding investors to 
require safeguards to be provided for in the issuer's memorandum of incorporation is 
limited.  The lack of liquidity of an unlisted company has an adverse effect on the share 
price (as often shares must be disposed of at a discount in order to fund a willing buyer 
and, commonly for a private company, only after pre-emptive rights provisions have 
been followed).  Prescribing a memorandum of incorporation for crowdfunded entities 
could (as an interim measure pending the establishment of a secondary market for 
crowdfunded shares) provide some relief to investors.   
Granting a put option in favour of investors would be almost always inequitable and, if 
held against the issuer, could constrain the company's liquidity, as it is a contingent 
liability.  There are other exit mechanisms issuer and any party that controls the issuer 
should be willing to concede in order to enjoy the benefits of crowdfunding.  These 
provisions should include the right of an investor to require the majority shareholder to 
purchase its shares at no less than the subscription price in the event of a trigger event 
                                               
151 Easterbrook and Fischel "The Corporate Contract" 1989 Columbia Law Review 1416 1435. 
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occurring that would either materially impact the ability of the issuer to continue 
business in accordance with its business plan or in the event that the majority 
shareholder proposes to dispose of its shares, the crowdfunding investors should be 
entitled to dispose of their shares on the same terms or acquire those shares on those 
terms pursuant to a pre-emptive right on sale.152 
In providing for those rights in favour of investors, the relative lack of liquidity of 
crowdfunded securities and the dominance that the majority investor in a crowdfunding 
entity enjoys must be taken into account.  The lack of a liquid secondary market for 
these securities not only creates a potential for oppression of minorities but also limits 
the safeguards available to minorities against the destruction of the value of the 
issuer.153  Liquidity is a powerful mechanism for investor protection as it allows 
investors to vote with their feet.154 
10.3 Mitigating investor risks 
Investor risks include limited or low levels of financial literacy, insufficient shareholder 
protection, the potential for unfair shareholder dilution, difficulty monitoring the issuer's 
performance or having meaningful input in the governance of the issuer, and being 
excluded from exit opportunities.155 
As is the case in the United States of America, platforms should be tasked with 
providing investor education and training, and also, assessing whether a particular 
investor is reasonably capable of making rational investment decisions. 
The remainder of the investor risks should be mitigated by way of a prescribed 
memorandum of incorporation for issuers, as discussed above, and should include a 
requirement that an issuer only issue a single class of shares (and no other security).156 
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A further mechanism for ensuring investor protection would be limiting the amount that 
an individual investor may invest in a single issuer and also in aggregate during the 
course of a single year.157  This would ensure that investors are not overly exposed to 
crowdfunded shares as an asset class and are therefore able to accept more risk as these 
securities would (theoretically) form a small part of their net worth. 
10.4 Mitigating platform risks 
The primary risks relating to platforms would be their ability to be used for money 
laundering,158 their failure to perform their duties (thereby compromising the 
crowdfunding transaction or the protections available to investors) and being exposed to 
potential conflicts of interest.159 
Money laundering  
Platforms are susceptible to being used as platforms for money laundering,160 not only 
by issuers but also by potential investors.161  Money laundering is often not the subject 
of crowdfunding discussion as: 
"[m]oney laundering arguably does not raise investor protection concerns because the investor 
is often either paid back in full without knowledge of the illicit source of money, or is in 
collusion with the issuer."162 
The response of regulators in the United States to money laundering concerns  is to 
require that platforms comply with anti-money laundering regulations analogous to 
those applicable to registered financial intermediaries.163  This option undoubtedly 
increases compliance costs and may not be the most effective solution given the relative 
large numbers of investors who each may invest a small sum of money.  Nonetheless, a 
"risk-based" anti-money laundering is proposed by some authors,164 on the basis that the 
limited compliance capital commanded by platforms should be allocated efficiently.165  
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A more cost-effective requirement that could be employed in order to reduce 
compliance costs for issuers, would be a requirement that all transactions by and 
between issuers, platforms and investors be conducted through the platform and by way 
of bank accounts registered in South Africa.   
The requirement that transactions be conducted through registered bank accounts is 
currently not a feature of the United States model.166  This would ensure that money 
laundering risk is managed indirectly by platforms, in reliance on the robust anti-money 
laundering protocols that banks are required to have in place.167  That is not to say, of 
course, that platforms are completely absolved from reporting suspicious activity that 
they discover in the course of operating the platform or in the course of conducting 
issuer due diligence.168 
Duties of a platform 
The United States of America model places lots of emphasis on the role of the platform 
(or crowdfunding intermediary) in ensuring the integrity of a crowdfunding securities 
market and protecting investors.169  Platforms are tasked with educating investors on the 
risks of investing,170 mitigating against fraud being perpetuated against investors,171 
circulating disclosure documents to potential investors and the appropriate regulators,172 
refunding investors in the event that the fundraising target is not met,173 and ensuring 
that firm funding commitments are made by investors.174 
The fundamental purpose of a platform is creating a market to facilitate the offering of 
and investment in securities.  As noted by Easterbrooke and Fischel markets are: 
"economic interactions among people dealing as strangers and seeking advantage".175 
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A platform will provide to issuers and investors services similar to those provided by an 
exchange (as defined in the FMA) although, for reasons set out above, a platform would 
not be an exchange unless it facilitates secondary market activities (and only to the 
extent that the securities traded are those of a public company or the activity undertaken 
by the platform provider become prescribed as falling within the ambit of the FMA). 
Like the model followed in the United States of America, platforms should either be 
authorized financial services provider (and therefore their conduct subject to regulation 
by the Financial Sector Conduct Authority) or designated as exchanges (however with 
lesser compliance requirements that take into account that their role is in relation to 
crowdfunding.176  These requirements would address how platforms would be required 
to manage potential conflicts of interest. 
11. CONCLUSION 
The role that equity crowdfunding can play in enabling small businesses cannot be 
overstated.177 
"There is a substantial reservoir of entrepreneurial talents, activity and capital lay dormant in 
many emerging economies.  So developing a regulatory framework that leverages advances of 
online financing technology can create an early-stage funding marketplace.  This will facilitate 
capital formation while providing investor protection through education and training.  The risk 
of online financing requires regulatory protection and collaboration with other entrepreneurial 
activities such as private sectors, incubators, accelerators and universities to build the culture of 
trust which is essential to promote web-based interactions."178 
One of the ways of keeping the costs of crowdfunding to a minimum is through the 
prescription of standardised contracts to govern the relationship between the 
crowdfunding stakeholders.179 There is no consensus as to the degree of control that is 
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necessary to ensure that disparate crowdfunding investors are able to vindicate their 
rights as securities holders.180  
A standardised memorandum of incorporation which provides for the exit rights of 
shareholders through tag-along rights and deemed offer provisions, restricts the 
authority of the board to conduct business other than that for which the capital raise 
occurs, provides for pre-emptive rights on both subscriptions and sales and restricts the 
company from issuing more than one class of shares would be such mechanism.  This 
approach accords with the view that corporate law is a mechanism by which open ended 
contracts are filled.181  A standardised memorandum of incorporation would also assist 
investors in making their investment decisions as they would be to the extent that a 
prospectus is required as opposed to a written statement or update prospectus  able to 
compare and contrast investments on a like for like basis 182 and also deal with the 
concern that the majority shareholder of the issuer is likely to have disproportionate 
power over the affairs of the company when compared to the crowd. 
The classification of the issuer as a private or public company will also play an 
important role in establishing a market for crowdfunding as it will have a direct effect 
the accountability requirements and compliance costs of the issuer.  To this end, an 
issuer should be classified as a private company or, if classified as a public company, 
exempted from the enhanced accountability and regulated company provisions of the 
Companies Act in order to ensure that it is able to maintain the flexibility it requires to 
undertake its business.   
This flexibility should also be availed to an issuer, provided it has used the standardized 
memorandum of incorporation and not previously raised an aggregate amount 
exceeding a prescribed maximum amount for small cap offers and has a shareholder 
base not exceeding a maximum number of persons (acting as principals), in relation to 
how it is able to make its offers to the public.  Either an abbreviated prospectus should 
be required of such firms or, it should be clarified that offers made through a platform 
that is already regulated do not amount to an advertisement, therefore availing to the 
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issuer the ability to raise capital through small cap offers without having to prepare and 
register a prospectus. 
Providing for these matters will ensure the development of a crowdfunding culture that 
minimises complexity and cost and enables entrepreneurs to compete for access to 
capital through a channel that will no doubt democratize investment and become an 
avenue for the entrepreneurial spirit that South Africa's participation in the fourth 
industrial revolution requires. 
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